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n limited dependent variable model is formulated to analyse the
effect of minimum wage regulations on employment and unemployment in the
~etherlands. The reduced form model is estimated with data from a cross-
sectivn of Dutch families. The stochastic specification of the model not
only allows for unobserved individual characteristics, but also for
meatiurt~me~nt errors on the wage rates. The results suggest that lowering
t';e minimum wage leads to a strong reduction of involuntary unemployment.
In order to be able to perform certain policy simulations, the
reduced form equation for labour market participation is replaced by a
structural neoclassical labour supply equation with preferred hours as the
endogetious variable. This implies that, in addition to the negative
demand-side effect of a high level of minimum wage rates on employment,
aisv the positive effect throug-h labour supply can be taken into account.
Labour supply appears to be a forward bending function of the wage rate
air.l the elasticity of the participation probability with respect to
unemplo~~iuent beneFits is very small, for both males and females.
Policy simulations - lowering of minimum wages or tax rates - with
tlie extended model suggest that the (demand-side) effect of lowering the
'productivity threshold' by reduction of before tax minimum wage rates
tends to dominate labour supply effects.
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1. Introduction
During years of recession, many economists blaim the downward wage
rigidity for the growth of unemployment. In the Netherlands and other
6~estern countries it has been suggested, that existing minimum wage
regulations migllt be an important source of such a rigidity. It has become
a matter of debate whether the benefits of minimum wage regulations are
,iot outweighed by their drawbacks, because the level of the minimu,n wage
rate - as to be paid by the firm - is too high.
On the one hand of course, the main purpose of minimum wage rates is
to raise incomes of employees, in particular those with low productivity.
On the other hand, the minimum wage barrier could prevent employers from
hiring these often young and unskilled or unexperienced workers, in which
c~~se - since unewployment benefits are generally lower than
(corresponding) wages - a negative effect on income results. And even if
this effect is small, a negative impact on the individual's well-being is
possible, since recent empirical studies suggest that many workers prefer
employment to unemployment, even if the incomes associated with both
states are equal (see, e.g., Kapteyn et al., 1988).
Dutch studies show that there is a relative surplus of potential low
wage earners - i.e. unskilled and unexperienced people - among the
unemployed iti the Netherlands (see Van Schaaijk, 1984) and that the growth
of unemployment is also strongly concentrated in this group, contrary to
the development in the U.S. (see CPB, 1986 and Frijns and Van Schaaijk,
198~). The share of minimum wage earners among employees fell from 9.9 ~
in 19~4 to 6.5 ~ in 1983. These facts taken together suggest that firms
ax~e trying to get rid of workers with low productivity.
In this paper a micro-economic approach, related to the work of Meyer
and Wise (1g83 a,b) in the U.S., is followed to analyse the impact of
n~inimum wage regulations on the Dutch labour market. The minimum wage law
is the only friction in the labour warket that is taken into account and
therefore the only cause of involuntary unemployment explicitly
incorporated in the model.
In Section 2, a limited dependent variable model based upon a two-
equations reduced form model of the labour market is presented and
estimated with data from a cross-section of Dutch males and females in
3
198la. Although the estimation results do not seem unreasonable, they also
reveal some important shortcomings of the model. Zn Section 3, a first
step is made towards a structural model of the labour market. The reduced
fcrm eyuatiori for labour market participation is replaced by a
r.coclassical labour supply equatiorr. ~lthough the specification of labour
supply is kept rather simple, sinrultaneous estimation of wage and supply
equations is very complicated because of the presence oF non-convex budget
sets. For this reason, the labour supply equation is estimated separately.
I~1 SecCion 4 some simulations are performed based upon the wage equation
in Section 2 and the structural labour supply equation in Section 3.
Concluding renrarks are mentioned in Section 5.
2. .~ reduced form model
In this sectíon we present a model which is closely related to the
t~no-equations model introduced by Meyer and Wise (1983a). The model
essentially consists of a wage equation and an equation to explain labour
market participation. The wage equation states that, in absence of minimum
wage regulations, the hourly before tax wage rate equals the worker's
marg~inal net productivity, which depends on observed and unobserved
pcrsonal characteristics:
log
Wt - Xt a} Elt '
(1)
where Wt : the hourly before tax wage rate for individual t in absence of
minimum ~,~age regulations,
Xt -(Xtl'ht2 """ Xtm) . vector of explanatory variables, mainly
individual characteristics of individual t(and including a
constant term),
a - (al,aL~, .. ,am)' . vector of parameters,
Elt' error term, representing unobserved characteristics of
individual t or errors in the observation of marginal
productivity by the employer.
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T'he wage rate wliich is actually paid will not always equal Wt, due to
several institutional constraints such as minimum wage regulations, union
agreements, fixed periodic salary raises, etc.. In this model only minimum
wage regulations are taken into account. The minimum wage rate for
individual t is denoted by Mt.
If Wt exceeds Mt, then ttie minimum wage law is not binding and the
before tax wage rate acttially paid, Wt, equals Wi.
If Wt is less than Mt, three outcomes are possible. Which outcome
occurs is indicated by an index variable It.
Firstly, the possibility exists that the minimum wage law does not
apply (in the Netherlands, this is the case for a small number of part
time jobs) or the employer finds some way to evade it (It- 1).
If the minimum wage law does apply, the employer can decide to raise
the wage to the minimum level (Wt- Mt, It- 2) or not to employ the worker
(I~- 3), in which crise, of course, no wage rate is observed.
W~r ns5ume th,rt Lhesc~ Lhree events occw~ with (conditionall))
probabilities P1, P2 and P3 - 1- P1 - P2 respectively.
T'he second equation is a reduced form equation for labour market
p,irticipation. The decision whether or not to participate on the labour
market may be assumed to depend on individual characteristics, the (after
tax) wage rate, unearned income, and unemployment benefits. In the
linearised reduced form equatiori we use in this section the wage rate is
eliminated and unearned income variables are ignored. In the next section,
this reduced form equation will be replaced by a structural labour supply
equation which does explicitly model the relationship between
participation and the preferred number of working hours on the one hand
and after tax wage rates and other income variables on the other.
The participation equation in this section is given by (2):
~
Et - ~1Xt1} ~2Xtz} ... ' ~m tm} E2t' (Z)
where Et is a latent variable with the property that the individual
participates on the labour market iff Et ) 0, Jl is a vector of parameters
to be estimated, and t;2t is an error term.
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we assume that (elt.e2t) is normally distributed with mean (0,0) and
covariance matrix
E - lóe Poe J .l 1
According to this model each individual can be in one of the
following five "states".
state 1: non-participant (Et~O).
state 2: participant, unemployed (Et)0, Wt~Mt, It-3).
sr.ate : participant, employed, Wt~Mt (Et~O, Wt~Mt).
state 4: participant, employed, Wt~Mt (Et)0, Wt~Mt, It-1).
state : participant, employed, Wt-Mt (Et~O, Wt(Mt, It-2).
If all wage r~ates were observed without measurement errors, it would still
be impossible to observe whether an unemployed individual in the sample is
in state 1 or in state 2, but it would be possible to split up sample
observations in four categories: those in state 1 and 2, those in state 3,
those in state 4 and people in state 5. In the data set Meyer and Wise
(1983 a,b) used, most wage rates are either exactly known without
measurement error (a correction for rounding errors is made by using a
winimwn wage interval instead of one minimum wage) or not known at all.
Our data set caitains only wage rates that are not exactly measured. We
make use of a cross-section of Dutch households and before tax wage rates
are constructed from hours worked and after tax labour income. Therefore,
at least three possible sources of ineasurement errors are present:
- errors in after tax labour income
- errors in hours worked
- errors ii1 the transformation of the after tax wage into the
before tax wage.
The explicit incorporation of a measurement error in the wage equation
thus seems inevitable. On the other hand, we assume that there is no error
in observing whether an individual is employed or not.
The measurement error is added to the wage equation additively. Let
Wo be the observed before tax wage rate. We assume
log wt - log wt t bt . (3)
where óL--N((),6~) rtnd bL is indupenc3cnL uf uLhcr randuw vttrinh.l~~:; in th~,
model.
Wanes of' a significant proportion of workers are missing. We assume
t.h,tt Lhe (conditíc~nr~l) pi~ob,~biLity thut a worker's wage is observed is the
ti,uui~ I~ur ril I iiulivi~lutil~; rind iJ~~nuti~ Lhis pt'ubabiliLy hy k.
'1'he presencc ol' me~isurewent errors and missing wag'e observatiotis
implies that the sample can only be split up in three subsamples:
unemployed individuals, etnployed individuals wíthout reported wage rate,
and workers whose wage rate is observed (although with measurement error).
The likelíhood contribution of individuals in these three subsamples is
easily derived by referring to the five states introduced above:
a. unemployed individuals are either in state 1 or state 2. The
likelihood contribution is given by
Pr(Et(0) t Pr(Et~O and WtCh1t) (1-P1-P2).
b. employed people without reported wage are either in state 3, state 4,
or state 5. The likelihood contribution is
{Pr(Et)0 and Wt)Mt) t Pr(Et~O and Wt~Mt)(P1tP2)} {1-R}.
c. employed persons with observed wage rate can also be in either one of
the states 3, 4 and 5; due to the measurement error, states 3, 4 and 5
canriot be dístinguished. The likelihood contribution is given by
{Pr(Et~O and Wt~MtlElt}bt-log Wt-Xta) fl(log Wt-Xta) f
Pr(E~~O and W~~M ~E tb -1og Wo-X'a) f(log Wo-X'a) P1 t (4)t t t lt t t t 1 t t
Pr(Et~O and Wt(D1t) f2(log Wt-log Mt) P2} R.
Itcre f1 i.s ttre (norwal) probability density function of Elttbt and F2 is
the density function of b. 'I'he conditional probabilities in (4) aret
bivariate normal; corresponding means and variances can easily be deri~,~ed
(see, e.g., Johnson and Kotz, 1972).
Data and estimation results
The model introduced above has been estimated with data from the
first wave of the 'Socio Economic Panel', collected by the Dutch Central
Bureau of Statistics (CBS) in April 1984. Our data set contains
information on 3914 Dutch roales and 4059 females of at least sixteen years
of age. The following explanatory variables are included in the vector Xt:
C~N: a constant term.
DED2, DED3, DED4 and DEDS: dummy variables referring to the individual's
eduration level. At the lowest level, all dummies equal 0; at the
second level DED2-1 and DED3-DED4-DED5-0, etc..
LACE: the iiatural logarithm oF the individual's age in April 1984.
L2AGE: the square of LAGE.
D65: dummy variable; D65-1 if the individual is older than 64 and 0
otherwise.
NCH: the number of children in the household (NCH-O if the individual
is not one of the parents).
DCH6: dummy variable; DCH6-1 if the individual has children younger than
six, DCH6-0 otherwíse.
DfIP: dumtuy variable; DHP-1 if the individual is the family head or
partner of the family head; DHP-O otherwise.
DSI: dummy variable; DSI-1 in case of a one-person household; DSI-O
otherwise.
D1P: dummy variable; D1P-1 if the individual is the only parent in the
housetiold; D1P-0 otherwise.
UNP: the unemployment percentage in the region where the individual is
living.
Table 1 contains some sample statistics of these variables and of the
endogenoiis variables and some infromation on the sample composition.
The model was estimated by Maximum Likelhood, using the algorithm
introduced by Berndt et al. ( 1974). The parameter p has been set equal to
0.2)A Lagrange-multiplier test was performed to test the hypothesis p-0.
This hypothesis was accepted at a 5 x level for both males and females
(the realisations of the asymptotically K~1)-distributed test statistic
were 0.4 and 2.6 for males and females respectively with a critical value
of 2.~).
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Table la. Sample statistics
Variable males
mean stand. min max numb.
dev. obs.
DED2 0.229 0.420 0 1 3914
DED3 0.384 0.486 0 1 3914
DED4 0.102 0.303 0 1 3914
DEDS o.048 0.213 0 1 3914
LAGE 3.628 0.430 2.77 4.54 3914
1.2ACE 13.347 3.103 7.69 20.64 3914
D65 o.i24 0.330 0 1 3914
tiCtt o.667 1.007 0 7 3914
DCH6 0.153 0.360 0 1 3914
DHP o.722 0.448 0 1 3914
Dsl 0.081 0.273 0 1 3914
D1P o.007 0.081 0 1 3914
UNP 17.615 2.537 14.6 24.2 3914
wbt 23.34 14.35 3.6 149.0 2089
W~at 13.07 5.70 2.9 57.9 2089
M 10.73 1.94 4.0 11.5 3914
H 43.04 11.44 2.0 90.0 2396
females
mean stand. min max numb.
dev. obs.
0.291 0.454 0 1 4059
0.282 0.450 0 1 4059
0.081 0.273 0 1 4059
0.010 0.100 0 1 4059
3.650 0.439 2.77 4.54 4059
13.513 3.181 7.69 20.64 4059
0.140 0.347 0 1 4059
0.696 1.020 0 7 4059
0.155 0.362 0 1 4059
0.700 0.458 0 1 4059
0.122 0.327 0 1 4059
0.047 0.211 0 1 4059
17.600 2.539 14.6 24.2 4059
16.01 7.90 3.7 81.8 1103
10.40 4.24 2.8 38.9 1103
10.78 1.88 4.0 11.5 4059
26.96 14.41 2.0 90.0 1284
Explanation:
Wbt: before tax hourly wage rate.
Wat: after tax hourly wage rate.
M: before tax minimum hourly wage rate.
H: actual number of working hours per week ( zero-observations excluded).
Table lb. Sample composition
males females
unemployed 1482 2750
employed, wage rate not observed 343 206
employed, wage rate obser.ved 2089 1103
Estimatiou results are presented in Table 2. A M indicates significance
on a 5 ~ level. The upper panel of this table contains parameter estimates
for the wage equation (1). The education level has the expected
significant positive impact on productivity and thus on wage rates, for
both m~iles und f'emales. Producti.vity increases with age for young people
an~i decreases with age for older people. For females, the maximum is
reached earlier (at age 37) than for males (at age 53) and the differences
are smaller. Figure 1 illustrates the total impact of age on the expected
before tax w~ir;e~ rate W~ (in absence of minimum wage regulations). Other
inili~ i~lu;il rli;ii~n~~l~,ri~:t i~~~; ur~~ .urL cciunl Lo tl~eir stuuple merrn5. 1'he actual
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minimum wage rate in The Netherlands is also sketched as a function of
age. The graph shows that the age-effect is larger for males than for
females. h]oreo~-ei~, Figure 1 reveals a remarkable difference in expected
wage rates between males and females. This difference is largely a
consequence of the fact that the mean education level is much higher for
males than for females.
Table 2. Estimation results ( t-values in parentheses)
Parameter Females
W"equation
coN -15.13 ( -8.3)"
DED2 0.135 ( 3.3)"DED3 0.343 ( 8.1) "
DED4 0.512 ( 10.2)"
DEDS o.856 ( 11.4)"
LAGE 9.870 ( 9.4)"
L2ACE -1.365 ( -9,2)"
D65 -0.0435 ( -0.2)
Ncx -0.064 ( -3.7)"
DCH6 -0.052 ( -1.1)
DHP 0.052 ( 1.0)
DSI o.108 ( 1.5)
D1P 0.114 ( 1.4)





G (w"equation) 0.370 ( 33.4)"
6S(meas. error) 0.103 ( 6.6)"
E"equation
coN -46.57 (-11.6)"
DED2 0.272 ( 3.7)x
DED3 0.428 ( 5.2)"
DED4 0.627 ( 5.5)"
DEDS o.862 ( 3.9)"
LACE 27.89 ( 11.9)"
L2AGE -4.05 (-12.3)"
D65 -0.104 ( -0.5)
NcH -0.283 ( -8.3)"
DCH6 -0.850 ( -9.9)"
DHP -0.341 ( -2.6)"
DSI -0.228 ( -1.5)
D1P -0.535 ( -3.0)"



































The significantly negative relationship between the wage rate and the
regional unemployment percentage UNP suggests that productivity is lower
in regions with high unemployment. It could, however, also mean that
frictior~s on ttle labour market imply a gap between productivity and wage
rate which is larger iF unemployment is larger. The model does not take
this kind of effects into account.
The estimates for P1 arld P2 for females imply that of the females who
want to work but whose productivity is too low in relation to the minimum
wage rate, 64 ~ will be employed; 24 ~ receive a wage below the minimum
and 110 ,o rc~~cive the minimum wage. The remaining 36 ~ are involuntarily
unemployed. 1'or males, the estimates of P1 and PZ are much smaller, in
particular ttre estimated probability oF receiving the minimum wage equals
zero. An explarxation for the large difference between males and females in
this respect may be the fact that in typically female jobs (non-
manufacturing sectors) productivity ís more difficult to measure and
easier to adapt (In our sample, only 1~ ~ of those working in the
manufacturing sector are females, whereas 49 ~ of employees in the service
sec tor rire fi-~mrr I ~~ ). 3)
Although Lhe estimated variance 6~ of the measurement error is muclr
smaller than the estimated variance of unobserved productivity differences
GE, it is sigrlificantly different from 0. This stresses the importarice of
including the measurement error in the model. According to the estimates,
the measurement error explains 6 ~ and 3 y of the variation in wage rates
of females and males respectively.
In Figures 3 and 4 observed and simulated distributions of wage rates
are compared. The differences log Wt - log Mt are divided into classes of
width 0.05 each. Figures 3 and 4 contain, for males and females
respectively, observed frequencies, simulated frequencies without
measurement errors, and simulated frequencies with measurement errors
included. The simulatíons refer to employed people only, i.e. predicted
wage rates have been weighted with the probabilities of not ending up in
states 1 or 2. Comparison of observed frequencies with simulated
frequencies reveals an important shortcoming of the model: the model
cannot explain the relatively large density of wage observations in
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that the miniunim wage may push up wage rates to a level above the minimum,
because of uniori agreeuients or other regulations, such as fixed periodic
salary raises, or because of the rise of reservation wage rates of
individuals looking for a(new) job.4) Extension of the model in this
direction will is a topic of' our future research.
5ome símulations
Using tlie estimation results it is possible to compute the
probabilities of the five different states introduced in Section 2.1 for
each individual. Table 3 coiitains the aggregate results, i.e. mean
probabilities for different education levels and age groups. According to
these results, 12.8 x of all males older than 15 and 3.8 ~ of all females
are unemployed because their productivity is too low in relation to the
minimum wage rate. The conditional probability that a man of lowest
education level is employed, given that he participates on the labour
market, is ~5 ~. For males of inedium education level ( DED3-1), this
probability is 88 ~. For females the corresponding probabilities are 82 ;:
and 93 ~ respectively. The main reason for the difference between males
and females is the difference in estimates for the probabilities P1 and
P2. The results imply that ( state 2-) unemployment as a fraction of the
number of people who participate on the labour market is 13.~ ~ for males
and 10.5 ~ for females. These figures are smaller than the macro-economic
ratc.~s of regisLered unemploymenT, in the Netherlands in April 1984, which
are 16.4 ~ and 19.0 ~ respectively. This may be explained by the fact that
the model does not explicitly take into account rigidities in the labour
market, other than minimum wage rate regulations.
Table 4 visualises the impact of a reduction of all minimum wage rates
on the probability of state 2. It shows that, according to this model,
involuntary unemployment would strongly fall if minimum wage rates are
reduced by 10 ï. If all minimum wage rates are reduced by 10 ~,
unemployment due to minimum wage regulations would fall by 28 i. for both
males and females.
These results should be interpreted with caution. Firstly, the
suggested reduction of all minimum wages is not very realistic; if minimum
wages are reduced, this probably applies to those with a new job only. The
-i5-
instantaneous effects thus would be much smaller than the figures in Table
4 suggest. Secondly, it has become clear from Figures 3 and 4 in the
previous section and from the figures in Table 3 discussed above, that
this model does not yield a complete description of rigidities in the
labour market. Finally, note that the model describes the labour market in
a ceteris-paribus context and does not take macro-economic effects into
account. If the reduction of before tax wage rates is followed by a
reduction in after tax incomes and leads to a fall in domestic
e~:penditures, a negative effect on employment may result.
Table 3. Probabilities ( in ~) on states in the labour market
state 1 state 2 state 3 state 4 state 5 sample
number
males
age below 25 50.7 12.5 34.3 2.4 0.0 722
25-34 4.5 13.8 79.0 2.7 0.0 924
35-44 2.6 7.2 88.8 i.4 0.0 767
45-54 13.5 5.9 79.4 1.2 0.0 553
55-64 46.3 3.4 49.6 0.7 0.0 463
65 and older 82.8 12.8 2.0 2.5 0.0 485
education level
1 51.4 12.1 34.1 2.3 0.0 928
2 31.0 12.4 54.2 2.4 0.0 895
3 17.4 9.9 70.8 1.9 0.0 ~504
4 17.9 2.6 79.0 0.5 0.0 401
5 15.5 i.2 83.i o.2 O.o 186
all males 28.6 9.8 59.7 1.9 0.0 3914
females
age below 25 51.8 5.1 34.1 3.4 5.6 725
25-34 5~.2 4.8 35-5 3-2 5.3 939
35-44 53.2 4.3 34.9 2.9 4.7 725
45-54 62.5 4.2 25.8 2.8 4.7 582
55-64 84.1 2.7 8.4 ~.8 3.0 519
65 and older 98.0 0.5 0.7 0.3 0.5 569
education level
~ 81.5 3.4 9.0 2.3 3.8 1362
2 62.0 5.1 23.9 3.4 5.6 1182
3 52.0 3-5 38.1 2.4 4.0 ~144
4 44.9 2.1 49.4 i.4 2.3 330
5 32.8 0.2 66.5 0.2 0.3 41
all females 64.1 3.8 25.4 2.5 4.2 4059
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Table 4. Impact of a reduction of all minimum wage rates on the
probability of state 2- unemployment
1 2 3 4 5
group sauiple probability prob after difference
number of state 2 l0~reduction (in ;G)
males per education level
education
1 928 12.1 9.3 -23.3
2 895 12.4 9.1 -26.7
3 1504 9.9 7.0 -28.8
4 1}0l z.6 1.7 -33.9
5 186 l.z o.9 -30.1
males per age group
age
below 25 722 12.5 9.3 -25.5
25-34 924 13.8 9.7 -30.1
35-44 767 7.2 4.6 -35.8
45-54 553 5.9 3.8 -36.3
55-64 463 3.4 2.2 -37.0
65 and oider 485 12.8 12.1 -5.5
all males 3914 9.8 7.2 -27.6
females per education level
education
1 1362 3.4 2.7 -20.8
2 1182 5.1 3.7 -26.3
3 1144 3.5 2.4 -33.5
4 330 2.1 1.3 -39.5
5 41 0.2 0.1 -5z.2
females per age group
age
below 25 725 5.1 3.6 -28.1
25-34 939 4.8 3.5 -28.0
35-44 725 4.3 3.0 -2g.1
45-54 582 4.2 3.1 -26.9
55-64 519 2.7 2.1 -20.8
65 and older 569 0.5 0.4 -13.6
all females 4059 3.8 2-8 -27.8
Explanation
column 3: probability of state 2(involuntary unemployment) before the
minimum wage reduction
column 4: the same probability after a reduction of all minimum wage rates
with 10 ~
colunui 5: the difference between columns 4 and 3 as a percentage of column
3
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3. A structural labour supply equation
In order to be able to analyse the effects of changes in the tax regime or
minimum wage and unemployment compensation regulations, it is necessary to
work with a more structural model of the labour market than the one
introduced in Section 2. In this section a first step towards such a model
is made: The reduced form equation for labour market participation ís
replaced by a structural labour supply equation that explains the
relationship between labour supply on the one hand and on the other hand
the after tax wage rate, household income apart from the individual's
wage, possible unemployment benefits and several of the individual
characteristics already considered in Section 2.
Since the purpose of this paper is not in the first place the
estimation of a complete labour supply model, the specification of the
labour supply equation is kept rather simple. We use a simplified (1-
person) version of the model introduced by Hausman and Ruud (1984), which
yields an individual labour supply function that is linear in other income
and quadratic in the after tax wage rate:
K
H~ - h(w,Y) - ROtRlw'n2w2'aMt F w~(1}~w)Z~ ~
j-1
(4)
where H" is optimal labour supply taking into account the linear budget
constraint C-wHtY (where C is consumption) only, Y is other household
income, Z-(Z1,...,ZK)' is a vector of individual characteristics, and
the Greek letters are unknown parameters.5)
The more complicated household version of this model has been
estimated with other Dutch data by Kapteyn et al. (1988) and by Kapteyn
and Woittiez (1988). Kapteyn et al. (1988) also derive the corresponding
direct utility function U(H,C) and discuss the problem of regularity of
the demand system (i.e., in particular, concavity of the cost function).
The nature of the data on preferred hours that we use (the scenario
~.~ill be explained in the next subsection) implies that there is no need to
take into account the progressive character of the tax system but we do
~~ant to incorporate unemployment benefits. Therefore, an individual's
budget set consists of two linear segments, as shown in Figure 5 below. In
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this figure, OHI denotes other household income not including unemployment
benefits and UC is the (maximal) unemployment compensation. It is assumed
that if an unemployed individual starts working, the unemployment
compensation is (as long as it is nonnegative) reduced by j5 ~ of the
earned after tax w~igc.6) This implies that the marginal wage rate on the
segment AB in the figure equals 0.25 w, where w is the after tax wage rate
in absence of unemployment benefits. If the individual works many hours a
week (more than H0-4UC~(3w)), unemployment benefits play no role and the
marginal wage rate equals w. This is the segment BC in the picture.
Optimal labour supply can be on either one of the segments AB and
BC. Because the budget set is non-convex, two different local utility
maxima are possible. In that case, values of the (direct or indirect)










The stochastic specification of flexible labour supply models in
case of non-convex budget sets is a delicate matter (see, e.g., Kooreman
and Kapteyn, 1986). In this paper we do not allow for random preferences,
but only for optimisation errors. These errors enter in two different
ways: Firstly in the chosen number of hours, given the choice between the
two segments (i.e. for given regime) and secondly in the choice of the
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regime. These two error sources are represented by random variables ~ and
n respectively.
Let
H` - h(w..Y )i 1 i (i-I,II).
where wI-0.25w, y1-UCtOHI (corresponding to the first segment),
and wll-w, yII-OHI (corresponding to the second segment).
Iii absence of optimisation errors, Regime I is chosen if Uj) UII and
Regime II if UIC UII. The optimisation error r~ is incorporated as follows:
If UI-UII~~ ~ 0, Regime I is chosen;
if UI-UIIt~ C 0, Regime II is chosen.
Let PI- Pr(UI-UIItn ~ 0) and PII- 1-PI.
The preferred number of hours, errors included, is now given by
HP -~ HÍ t~ with probability PI
HIIt ~ with probability PII
(5)-
Note that HP can be negative, implying that the individual prefers not to
work. It is assumed that the error terms ~ and ~ are independent and
noL~mally distributed with mean 0 and variances 6~ and o~ respectively.
From (5), it is straightforward to derive the likelihood
contribution for the (one-equation) labour supply model for employed as
well as unemployed individuals if the after tax wage rate is known. Since
the wage rate is unknown for all unemployed and some employed individuals,
simultaneous estimation of wage equation (1) and labour supply would be
tlle most appropriate way to estimate the complete model. Because of the
complexity of the labour supply model - mainly due to the non-convex
budget sets - this is computationally intractable. Therefore, as is usual
practice ín empirical work on pure labour supply models, we use
predictiuns to replace unknown wage rates. These predictions are based on
t}ie model and the estimation results discussed in Section 2.
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Data and estimation
'1'Ix~ L~i~uur supply eyuut.ion has bcen esLimaLe:d with daCa 1'rom the
same cross-section as used for the model in Section 2. Some observations
of the 3914 males and 4059 females were removed because a component of
liousehold non-labour income was missing. Eventually, data on 3~94 males
rin~i j941 femtilu5 wcri~ utic~f.
'1'he enclc~genous variable in the labour supply eyuation is preferred
tiours. An extensive motivation for the use of' preferred hours and not
actual hours is given in Kapteyn et al. (1988). The main reason is the
fact that actual hours do not reflect individual preferences due to the
many constraints in the labour market that the individual faces. Preferred
hours in the data set are for the employed individuals the answer to the
question
"How many hours a week would you like to work if you could choose
freely and if your tiourly after tax wage rate remains as it is now ?
Assume that other family members do not change their number of
working hours."
The formulation of this question motivates the use of a linearised budget
set. Soine employed individuals do not answer this question; we assume
their preferred number of hours is positive. Someone without a paid job is
asked whether he or she is looking for work and if so for how many hours a
week. Since it is not asked which wage rate the individual has in mind
while answering this question, the use of predicted wage rates cannot be
avoided.
Sample information about preferred labour supply and household
income is summarized in Table 5. For other variables (wage rates and
individual characteristics) we refer to Table 1. The
model has been estimated for males and females separately by Maximum
Likelihood using t.he algorithm of Berndt et al. (19~4). Estimation results
without imposition of concavity of the cost function are mentioned in
Table 6a. The meaning of tlie individual characteristics LAGE, .. , D1P is
explained in Section 2. These results imply that for 1.~ x of all males
and 1.9 ~ of all females in the sample (in particular those with extremely
high wage rates) concavity is not satisfied. For these individuals the
micro-economic foundation (utility maximising behaviour) is lost.
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The model has also been estimated with imposition of concavity for
all males and females.7) The estimation results in this case are mentioned
in Table bb. Ttiey are not essentially different from the results without
imposition oF concavity. A likelihood ratio test rejects the hypothesis
that the concavity condition is satisfied for all sample observations, for
males as well as females. Because we want to perform policy simulations
for all individuals, including those with a high wage rate, our
si~.!ulations are based on the estimation results in Table 6b. Therefore, in
what follows we restrict ourselves to the discussion of the results with
inposition of concavity.
Table 5a. Sample composition
category
employed, preferred hours known
employed, preferred hours not known
looking for a job, preferred hours known,
not receiving unemployment compensation
looking for a job, preferred hours known,
receiving unemployment compensation
looking for a job, preferred hours not known,
noL receiving unemployment compensation
looking for a job, preferred hours not known,
receiving unemployment compensation
unemployed, not looking for a job,
not receiving unemployment compensation
unemployed, not looking for a job,
receiving ur7employment compensation



















stand. min max numb.
dev. observ.
HP 39.ï1 10.08 1 90 2648
oHl 383-57 420.65 0 4011 3794
Lc 316.16 155.95 3 1108 646
Explanation:
25.42 12.53 1 75 1520
636.21 410.22 0 4011 3941
212.30 122.59 1 699 330
HP : preferred hours; zero observations excluded
OHI : family income, the individual's wage and unemployment compensation
excluded ( in Dfl per week)
UC : unemployment compensation (in Dfl per week); zero observations
excluded
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Table 6a. Estimation results without imposition of concavity
(standard errors in parentheses)
parameter males




-765.1 (33.1 ) -260.7 (40.6 )
8.43 ( 0.63) 6.90 ( 0.34 )
-0.048 ( O.oo28) -0.168 ( 0.0091)
-0.0076 ( 0.0007) -0.0034 ( 0.0007)
c(hours equation) 18.11 ( 0.24 ) 19.21 ( 0.45 )
o~(utility comparison) 82.2 (16.4 ) 83.7 (10.4 )
n
wl(LAGE) 452.4 (19.1 ) 159.4 (23-7 )
W2(L2AGE) -64.64 ( 2.68 ) -24.81 ( 3.36 )
w (D65) -12.51 ( 1.80 ) -11.03 ( 2.12 )
w~(NCH) 0.63 ( 0.47 ) -2.45 ( 0.34 )
w (DCH6) -2.91 ( 1.33 ) -8.76 ( 0.91 )
~,6(DHP) -5.18 ( 1.22 ) -14.05 ( 1.38 )
y~7(DSI) -11.01 ( 1.41 ) -8.75 ( 1-70 )
~9(D1P) -6.05 ( 3-43 ) -10.72 ( 1.86 )
Table 6b. Estimation results after imposition of concavity
(Standard errors in parentheses)
parameter males females
n0(constant term) -862.78 ( --- )7) -370.41 ( --- )7)
rrl(wage rate) 10.34 ( 0.78 ) 4-15 ( 0.36 )
rt(squared wage rate) -0.0164 ( 0.0009) -0.037 ( 0.0021)
(32(other income) -0.0101 ( 0.0007) -0.0032 ( 0.0007)
o(hours equation) 18.53 ( 0.24 ) 22.11 ( 0.51 )
Gn(utility comparison) 61.45 (18.9 ) 37.97 ( 8.10 )
y~l(LAGE) 512.4 (20.8 ) 227.1 (27.5 )
y2(L2AGE) -73.06 ( 2.92 ) -34.05 ( 3.89 )
w (D65) -13.64 ( 1.93 ) -19.67 ( 3.24 )
w4(NCH) 0.63 ( 0.49 ) -3.06 ( 0.37 )
~5(DCH6) -3.47 ( 1.44 ) -8.z4 ( 0.92 )
w6(DHP) -6.02 ( 1.33 ) -14.07 ( 1.55 )
W (DS1) -13.68 ( 1.52 ) -8.28 ( 1.92 )
w9(DlP) -7.67 ( 3-43 ) -12.07 ( 1.99 )
All parameters except one (W4 for males) are significantly different
from 0. The negative estimates of the j3's imply that both male and female
leisure are normal goods.
The dependence of preferred hours on the after tax wage rate is shown
in Figure 6, where expected preferred hours are sketched as a function of
the after tax wage rate for the 'average' male and female with mean other
tiousehold income and without unemployment compensation. Both male and
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female labour supply functíons appear to be forward bending and the own
wage elasticity is larger for females than for males. In Figure 7 expected
preferred hours are sketched as a function of age. Other characteristics
at:d wage rates are set equal to the sample means. The graph reveals the
fact that females reach their 'labour supply top' at an earlier age than
males. Only very few people older than 65 want to work. The downward jump
in preferred hours at age 65 might have a sociological background: In the
Netherlands, it is uncommon not to retire at the age of (at most) 65. (See
Kapteyn and Woittiez (1988) who explicitly incorporate the reference group
as an explanatory variable in the labour supply model). Note that Figure 7
r~efers to a partial effect only: the fact that the wage rate also varies
with age (see the estimation results for the wage equation in Section 2)
is not taken into account. The impact of variables relating to family
composition on preferred hours is stronger for females than for males.
ólost of the estimates have the expected sign.
The participation probability in the labour supply model is defined
as the probability that preferred hours HP given by (5) (including both
sources of optimisation errors) are positive. The estimated participation
probabilities fer 'representative' individuals are sketched in Figures 8
and 9 as functions of the wage rate and the level of unemployment benefits
respectively. From Figure 8 it is clear that the sensitivity of the
participation decision with respect to one's own wage rate changes is much
larger for females than for males. For the average female, the probability
ranges from 0.16 for low wage rates to 0.95 for high wage rates, whereas
64 ~ oF the 'average' males even would like to work (few hours a week)
without a wage.
Tt1e estimated impact of unemployment benefits on the participation
pr~obability is quite small, as is revealed by Figure 9. A possible
explanation might be the fact that people can work few hours without
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4. Simulations based on the extended model
In this section the results of some policy simulations based on the
wage equation (1) in Section 2 and the labour supply equation (5) in
Section 3 are presented. With the estimated wage equation the systematic
part of the before tax wage rate is generated for each individual in the
sample. A drawing of the error term E is added. This is repeated five
times (with independent drawings of E) for each observation. The before
tax wage rate is transformed into an after tax wage rate and this wage
rate is inserted into the labour supply equation. As a result,
probabilities on the five labour market states as described in Section 2
are computed. The results are aggregated per education level and per age
category. These operations are performed in three different situations:
for the actual (1984-) minimum wage regulations and the actual tax regime,
after a change in the minimum wage regulations and after a change in the
tax regime.
Table 7 presents simulation results before policy changes. There is a
remarkable difference between the figures in the columns 3 through 6 of
this table and the corresponding figures in Table 3 of Section 2. Note
that figures in Table 3 are based upon estimation results that only take
into account information about actual wage rates and actual participation,
whereas Table 7 is also based on information about preferred labour
supply. Apparently, the data on preferred labour supply (together with
the model assumptions) imply a larger tendency to work than can be
predicted by actual eroployment figures (and model assumptions). Comparison
with sample information yields the following figures.
h1ales
sample simulation with simulation with
realisation reduced form model extended model
(Table 3) (Table 7)
working 62,1 ~ 61,6 x 71,3 ,~
looking for work 7,6 ~ 9,8 y. 10,0 ~
non-participant 30,2 ~ 28,6 x 18,6 ~
I"emales
working 32,z ~ 32,1 ;~ 42,6 ~
looking for work 6,6 ~ 3,8 ti 4,4 ;~
non-participant 61,2 ~ 64,1 ~ 53,0 ~
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The extended model predicts a tendency to work which is extremely
large. This might be a consequence of a lack of flexibility in the
specification of the labour supply model, since this equation has to
explain participation decision and preferred hours at the same time. On
the supply side of the labour market, unobserved fixed costs of working
(for i'emales in particular) may play a role. On the other hand,
restrictions on the demand side that are not incorporated, such as a lack
of job offers with few working hours, also might play a role.
Co.lumns 7 through 10 in Table ~ refer to predicted wage rates. In
columns ~ and 8 before tax wage rates are presented; column ~ gives
uilweighted means oF the predictions per age and education category,
whereas the figures in column 8 are weighted means, where the weights are
determined by the probability that someone is employed. Z'hus the wage
rates in column 8 are larger than those in column 7 for two reasons: those
with a relatively high wage rate have the largest probability of a large
enough productivity to be employed and also have the largest participation
probability, since labour supply is forward bending.
Columns 9 and 10 are similar to columns ~ and 8 respectively but
refer to predicted after tax wage rates. The last column oF the table
contains preferred hours, as predicted by the model of Section 3. Zeroes
are fully included in the computation of the category means.
The first policy simulation we discuss is a reduction of all minimum
wage rates in the sample by 10 ~. This same change was also considered in
Section 2, where the simulation was performed with the reduced form model.
Table 8 shows the results in terms of deviations from the figures in Table
~. Because very few people over 65 want to work anyhow, these people are
not taken into account in the policy simulations in this section (they
were in Section 2 and in Table ~). Results are very similar to the
corresponding results in Section 2. Involuntary unemployment is strongly
reduced because the productivity threshold is lowered. This effect is much
stronger than the labour supply effect: The lowering of minimum wage rates
leads to a smaller expected wage rate for low-productive persons and thus
to a smaller propensity to work.8) For example, in case of a 10 x
reductioil of minimum wage rates, for females, the productivity effect
yields a decrease in involuntary unemployment of about 27 ;L, whereas the
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supply effect only causes a 2 ~ decrease. For males, the supply effect is
even smaller.
From columns 6 through 9 it: becomes clear, that a reduction oF
minimwn wages has a negative impact on earned wage rates. Because of the
progressive character of the tax system, this 'income effect' is smaller
for after tax wag~e rates than for before tax wage rates. The effect is
rather small, because for the largest part of the employees - those with a
high enough productivity to guarantee employment in the actual 1984-
5it.uatiun - nothinq clinn~;c5 iC tuinimtnn wFibc~ rcites change.
'Cu anulyse the consequences of' a reduction of income taxes, i.e. a
reduction of the distance between before and after tax wage rates, a
simulation of a 10 ~ rise of all after tax wage rates was performed.
Before tax wage rates are not changed, apart from changes due to another
minimwn wage 1~iw. f3cfore tax minimum wage rates are reduced by 10 ~, so
that after tax minimum wage rates approximately remain unchanged.
Consequences of this policy change are summarised in Table 9. Again,
the productivity effect strongly dominates the supply effect. The rise of
after tax wage rates results in a lower degree of non-participation
(columns 2 and 3) and thus induces an increase in involuntary
unemployment. But the fall in involuntary unemployment caused by the
lowering of the productivity threshold (a consequence of the reduction of
before tax wage rates) is much larger. As a result, involuntary
unemployment falls, though not as much as was the case for the first
policy simulation. Because tax rates are reduced, earned after tax wage
rates rise, but because more people with low wage rates find a job, the
rise is less than 10 ~. The latter argument also explains the fall in
before tax wage rates.
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Table 7. Simulation of the actual (1984-) situation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 l0 11
broup number probability wage rates hours
males
education 1 901 33.5 14.3 49.4 2.8 12.3 16.5 8.2 10.4 17.7
2 867 18.2 13.1 66.1 2.5 15.6 18.5 10.0 11.6 26.3
3 1459 12.a 8.8 76.6 1.7 19.7 22.3 12.3 13.6 32.1
4 390 10.5 1.9 87.3 0.4 28.8 30.8 17.i 18.2 37.0
5 177 10.7 0.6 88.6 0.1 34.7 37.2 20.2 21.4 38.9
age
below 25 697 17.8 18.2 60.4 3.5 10.4 12.1 7.1 8.0 20.5
25-34 911 2.4 13.8 81.2 2.7 20.0 21.9 12.5 13.5 39.5
35-44 751 i.8 6.0 91.1 1.2 24.5 25.6 14.8 15.4 42.0
45-54 539 6.0 6.7 86.i 1.3 24.2 25.7 14.6 15.4 32.5
57-64 448 22.7 4.7 71.7 0.9 24.2 26.2 14.5 i5.5 17.1
older than 64 448 92.5 5.6 0.8 1.1 6.8 9.7 5.2 6.9 0.0
all males 3794 18.6 10.0 69.4 1.9 18.7 21.6 12.1 13.6 28.2
females
education 1 1321 68.9 5.2 16.7 9.3 11.1 12.1 8.1 8.6 3.1
2 1149 50.6 5.4 34.3 9.7 12.8 14.0 9.1 9.6 7.7
3 1109 42.4 3.5 47-8 6.3 15.5 17.1 10.6 11.4 11.8
4 322 36.3 1-5 59-5 2.7 19.5 21.6 13.1 14.3 16.2
5 40 20.8 0.2 78.6 0.4 29.9 32.i i8.6 19.9 z7.i
age
below 25 705 28.1 6.6 53.6 11.7 10.4 11.2 7.5 8.0 15.3
25-34 928 40.8 5.3 44.4 9.5 15.7 17.8 10.7 11.9 11.9
35-44 706 44.2 4.3 43.8 7.7 16.3 18.7 11.1 12.4 9.6
45-54 562 52.6 4.4 35.1 7.9 15.2 17.8 10.4 11.8 5.9
75-64 500 74.5 4.3 13.6 7.6 12.8 15.0 9.1 10.3 0.9
older than 64 540 98.2 0.5 0.5 0.8 10.7 12.0 8.0 8.7 0.0
all females 3941 53.0 4.4 34.7 7.9 13.7 15.1 10.1 10.8 8.2
Explanation:
3: itot participating on the labour market
4: (involuntarily) unemployed due to a lack of productivity
5: employed, wage rate above the minimum level
6: employed, wage rate on or below the minimum
7: predicted before tax wage rates, uiiemployed people included
8: predicted before tax wage rates, unemployed people excluded
y: predicted after tax wage rates, unemployed people included
10: predicted after tax wage rates, unemployed people excluded
11: preferred hours, non-participants included
-30-
Table 8. Simulation of a reduction of all minimum wage rates
1 2 3 4 5
group sample state 2-unemployment
number actual -10 i
abs rel
6 7 8 9
before tax wage after tax wage
actual -10~ actual -10 ~
rel rel
males
education 1 708 17.1 -4.4 -25.8
2 780 13.4 -4.0 -30.2
3 1336 9.1 -3.0 -32.7
4 361 2.0 -1.1 -53.8
5 177 0.8 -0.7 -87.2
age
below 25 697 18.2 -5.1 -28.1
25-34 911 13.2 -3.9 -z9.6
35-44 751 6.8 -2.3 -34.0
45-54 539 6.4 -2.0 -30.9
55-64 448 5.2 -1.9 -36.3
16.5 -2.8 10.5 -2.1
18.6 -2.4 11.6 -1.8
22.3 -1.8 13.6 -1.4
30.3 -0.7 17.9 -0.6
37.8 -0.5 21.7 -0.4
12.3 -2.6 8.1 -2.0
22.1 -2.3 13.6 -1.7
25.1 -1.4 15.2 -1.1
25.8 -1.3 15.4 -1.0
26.2 -1.5 15.5 -1.2
all males 3346 10.6 -3.2 -30.3 22.4 -2.1 13.6 -1.7
females
education 1 963 6.8 -1.7 -2~~.8 12.3 -2.2 8.6 -2.0
2 1062 5.9 -1.7 -29.5 14.1 -1.6 9.7 -1.4
3 1040 3.7 -1.3 -34.4 17.3 -1.1 11.5 -0.9
4 299 2.1 -0.9 -40.2 21.4 -0.7 14.2 -0.6
5 37 0.2 -o.o -4.0 32.3 0.0 19.9 -o.o
age
below 25 705 6.8 -2.0 -28.6 11.0 -1.5 7.9 -1.4
25-34 928 5.3 -1.6 -30.8 18.0 -1.4 12.0 -1.2
35-44 706 4.3 -1.4 -32.0 19.0 -1.2 12.5 -1.1
45-54 562 4.4 -1.4 -30.9 17.7 -1.4 11.8 -1.3
55-64 500 4.2 -0.9 -zo.5 15.1 -2.1 10.3 -1.9
all females 3~IOl 5.1 -1.5 -29.2 16.1 -1.5 10.9 -1.3
Explanation:
columns 3 through 5 refer to the probability, that someone's productivity
is not large enough to work (state 2-unemployment)
3: this probability in the actual (1984-) situation
4: absolute change in the column 3 probability after a reduction of all
minimum wage rates with 10 ~
5: relative change in the column 3 probability after this 10 ~ reduction
columns 6 and 7 refer to before tax wage rates of employed persons
6: the actual (1984-) situation
7: the relative change after a 10 ~ reduction of minimum wage rates
columns 8 and 9 refer to after tax wage rates of employed people
8: see 6; 9: see 7
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Table 9. Simulation of a reduction of income taxes with 10 ~
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
group abs rel abs rel abs rel abs rel rel rel abs rel
ma~-~s
education level
1 -0.9 -5.0 -4.3 -25.4 6.0 9.7 -0.8 -25.4 -2.8 7.7 1.0 4.5
2 -0.7 -ï.3 -4.0 -29.8 5.5 7.4 -0.8 -29.8 -2.4 8.0 1.2 4.0
3 -0.6 -10.1 -3.0 -32.4 4.1 4.9 -0.6 -32.4 -1.8 8.4 1.3 3.6
4 -0.4 -10.4 -i.1 -53.6 i.7 1.8 -0.2 -53.7 -0.8 9.3 1.3 3.4
5 -0.4 -16.6 -0.7 -87.2 1.2 1.2 -o.l -87.1 -0.6 9.5 1.4 3.2
a~e
below 25 -0.9 -5.2 -5.0 -27.7 6.9 11.5 -1.0 -27.7 -2.7 7.7 0.9 4.5
25-34 -0.3 -ii.9 -3.9 -29.4 4.9 6.0 -0.8 -29.4 -2.3 8.1 1.2 3.0
35-44 -0.2 -i3.3 -2.3 -33.8 3.0 3.3 -0.4 -33.8 -1.4 8.8 1.3 3.0
45-54 -0.6 -i0.7 -2.0 -30.4 3.0 3.4 -0.4 -30.4 -1.3 8.8 1.4 4.3
55-64 -1.6 -7.0 -1.8 -35.3 3.8 5.4 -0.4 -35.3 -1.5 8.6 1.4 8.2
all
males -0.6 -7.3 -3.2 -29.9 4.4 5.7 -0.6 -29.9 -2.2 8.0 1.2 3.8
females
education level
1 -2.2 -3.8 -1.4 -z1.1 6.2 26.5 -2.6 -21.0 -1.4 8.6 0.9 21.1
2 -2.9 -6.3 -i.5 -25.7 7.2 19.6 -2.7 -25.7 -1.3 8.7 1.5 17.7
3 -3.5 -9.0 -1.2 -3i.2 6.7 i3.1 -2.1 -31.2 -1.1 8.9 2.0 15.6
4 -3.8 -i1.7 -0.8 -36.8 6.0 9.7 -1.4 -36.8 -1.2 8.8 2.4 ~4.4
5 -2.7 -i8.i o.0 2.0 2.7 3.2 0.0 2.2 -0.7 9.3 2.7 9.3
age
beiow 25 -2.0 -7.0 - 1.8 -26.1 7.0 13.3 - 3.2 -26.1 -1.5 8.5 1.6 10.4
25-34 -3.1 -7.6 -1.4 -27.0 7.i 15.8 -2.4 -27.0 -1.9 8.2 1.8 i5.o
35-44 -3.7 -8.4 -i.2 -27.5 7.o i5.9 -2.1 -27.5 -1.9 8.1 1.9 15.6
45-54 -4.0 -7.5 -1.2 -26.5 7.2 20.7 -2.1 -26.5 - ~.9 8.2 1.7 29.2
55-64 -i.9 -2.6 - 0.7 -17.0 3.9 28.4 - i.3 -17.0 - 0.9 9.0 0.5 52.4
all
females -3.0 -6.5 -1.3 -25.5 6.6 16.5 -2.3 -25.6 - 1.2 8.5 1.6 16.5
Explanation:
all figures refer to absolute (abs) or relative (rel) changes with respect
to the actual 198~-situation
2: not participating on the labour market (state 1)
3: unemployed due to a lack of productivity (state 2)
4: employed, wage rate above the minimum level
5: employed, wage rate on or below the minimum
6: predicted before tax wage rates, unemployed people excluded
7: predicted after tax wage rates, unemployed people excluded
8: preferred hours, non-participants included
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5. Concluding remarks
This paper is an attempt to analyse the impact of minimum wage
regulations on the Dutch labour market. The estimation results of the
r~;~3uced form model introduced in Section 2 suggest that involuntaxy
unemployment wouLd fall sharply if miniroum wages were reduced. A large
fraction of registered unemployment in the Netherlands can be explained by
the gap between productivity and the minimum wage rate. A 10 ~ reduction
of before tax minimum wage rates would lead to a 28 ;G decrease of this
kind of involuntary unemployment. This result however should be
interpreted with some caution, because the minimum wage rate is the only
source of involuntary unemployment that is explicitly taken into account.
The effect might therefore be overestimated. This raises the question
whether the specification of the model is correct. Comparison of actual
and simulated wage rate distributions suggest that at least one effect of
minimum wage laws should have been included: the minimum wage may push up
wage rates to a level slightly above the minimum.
On a more principal level, the question may be asked whether the data
used can really identify the difference between voluntary and involuntary
unemployment. If only data on actual wages and participation are used, it
is eventually the model assumptions - about the distributions of included
random variables - that identify this difference. Recently collected Dutch
tiousehoid data also contain information on preferred working hours and the
question whether someone is looking for a job or not. In general, doubts
about the value of such data may exist, for example because the
description of the scenario under which preferred hours are given is never
complete. Still it seems worthwile to compare the estimation results of a
model that does not use this information with the information or with
results of a model that does use the information.
In tlie Section 3 model, information on preferred hours is essential.
A structural labour supply equation is estimated with preferred labour
supply as the endogenous variable. The main finding is the Fact that
labour supply is a forward bending function of the ( own) wage rate, for
both males and females. Moreover, the elasticity of labour market
participation with respect to the level of unemployment benefits is
extremely small.
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Ici Section 4, the structural labour supply equation is combined with
the wage equation from Section 2. Model simulations and sample information
,~re compared. Tlie 'extended' model seems to yield an overestimation of
employment, probably as a consequence of too primitive a specification of
labour supply. The reduced form (automatically) yields a better fit in
this respect, but does not completely reproduce the sample separation
bettieen voluntary and involuntary unemployment.
Policy simulations with the extended model show that productivity
(demand-side) effects on the labour market - in particular the lowering of
the proàuctivity frontier by reducing the (before tax) minimum wage rates
- tend to domiciate labour supply effects.
-3~-
Notes
1) P1 is the probability that someone is employed at a wage below the
minimum, given the fact that Wt ~ Mt and that he or she wants to work.
2) If p equals 0, parameters in the wage equation can be consistently
estimated without use of the participation equation, but this
estimation procedure is much less efficient.
3) A variant of the model in which P2 depends on the gap between the
threshold level and the marginal productivity (log Mt-log Wt), as in
Meyer and Wise (1983b), was also estimated but the results were not
satisfactory: Tlie estimated impact was insignificant and had the
counerintuitive sign.
4) Another possible cause might be the fact that in January 1984 minimum
wage rates in the Netherlands were lowered with 3 x.
5) This is a reparameterisation of the original Hausman-Ruud equation,
given by
~
H -~3 {8 . Y t bW t 0.5yW } t~W t b,
K
namely bpt ï wjZj-á , n~-b~tJ38 , n1-J3bt~ , n2- 0.5l~ó .
j-1
This labour supply equation is derived (with Roy's identity) from the
indirect utility function
v(w,M) - e~W{ 9 t M. sw t o.5~w2}.
6) This is a good approximation for the most common system of social
security in the Netherlands.
7) Imposition of concavity is achieved by imposing linear restrictions on
the constant term n~ in terms of other parameters (See Kapteyn et al.
(1988) for details). One of these restrictions eventually appears to be
binding; therefore in Table 6b no standard error for the estimate of
the constant term was computed.
-35-
8) If the predicted value of Wt is smaller than Mt, the prediction of Wt
is a weighted mean of Wt and Mt, where the weights are determined by
the probabilities P1 and P2.
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